이 정석 교수의 신학 문답 Q&A

1.4 Previous Approaches

1.4.1 H. W. Tribble (1937)

Tribble's dissertation entitled The Doctrine of Sanctification in the Theology of Karl Barth [160] is the first study on our subject.  Even before Karl Barth himself systematized his doctrine of sanctification two decades later (1955), Tribble had attempted to present a systematic description of Karl Barth's doctrine of sanctification in his 1937 Edinburgh dissertation.  The only available text at the time was an article entitled “Rechtfertigung und Heiligung” (1927), though he tried to utilize all the early writings of Karl Barth.  He had even participated in Barth's seminars on ethics and especially those on sanctification which were, however, not quoted because they were as yet unpublished. [161]

However, his work is praiseworthy and precise even from the perspective of Barth's own presentation two decades later as well as our contemporary Barthian scholarship more than a half century later.  Also, he set a model for subsequent studies, though regrettably his pioneering work seems unknown to later theologians.  In chapter 1, following Barth's thesis that “each doctrine must be studied in its relation to all the others,” he began to secure the right perspective by relating this doctrine to Barth's Christology, view of time and eternity [contingent contemporaneousness], eschatology, revelation and God.  Chapters 2 and 3 gave a balanced discussion of its objective aspect from the Christological perspective and its subjective aspect from the Pneumatological perspective.  Chapters 4, 5, and 6 dealt with some special issues: justification and sanctification, perfection and the Christian life, church and society.  In the conclusion, chapter 7, he summarized the distinctiveness of Barth's doctrine of sanctification in three propositions: (i) God's claim upon man rather than a change in man's character; (ii) works of sovereign grace acting upon man rather than a divine-human co-operation; and (iii) a discontinuous act rather than a continuous process. [162]   He also defended Karl Barth against every objection and praised his contributions.

Of course, his understanding clearly reflects some distinct ideas of the early Barth, but he could not represent Barth's doctrine of sanctification in its mature form, for it reflects only the early writings and therefore represents Barth's early view of sanctification.  As he himself recognized several times, it was “in the process of construction.” [163]

1.4.2 J. C. Lombard (1957)

As soon as Barth had published the CD IV/2 containing the doctrine of sanctification in 1955, Lombard wrote his dissertation on the subject, Die Leer van die Heiligmaking by Karl Barth. [164]   The main purpose of this study was “to reflect on the doctrine of sanctification in the theology of Karl Barth.” [165]   But, the other important task was to investigate the contemporary claim that Barth had changed.  It had been raised by his “self-corrective” statements in IV/2 (§64.1), that the theology from above (“God to man”) must be complemented by the theology from below (“man to God”).  In the response to it, the general consensus was affirmative to the “discontinuity in Barth's earlier and later thoughts” and the dividing line might be 1932, when Barth began to publish his Church Dogmatics. [166]

Accordingly, Lombard began his dissertation by analyzing “Barth's theological development and the doctrine of sanctification until 1932” in chapter 1.  Next, in chapters 2 and 3, he reflected upon the later doctrine of sanctification as presented in the Church Dogmatics since 1932, though, except II.A where he made a brief survey on I/1 to IV/1, the main body of his dissertation is a simple review of the recently published volume IV/2, chapter by chapter, section by section, following “the referent-systematic method” [167] which quotes as much as possible so as to allow Barth himself to speak.  Thus he followed Barth's own structure of presenting his doctrine of sanctification, preceded by its Christological and hamartiological presuppositions and followed by its applications to the church community and the individual Christian.

Then in chapter 4, he concluded his study with some critical evaluations as well as some positive appreciations.  Concerning the question of discontinuity, he argued that Barth's doctrine of sanctification as contained in CD IV/2 was a consistent continuation and application of the ground motif of his theology, i.e., “grace-triumph” (genadetriomf), [168] as his point of departure here also was the universalistic tendency of his doctrine of reconciliation, coupled with the “grace-objectivism” (genadeobjektivisme). [169]   But he also said that Barth's inclusive Christological anthropology in the doctrine of sanctification, which views Jesus as “the exemplary and prototype Holy One,” testified to his general agreement with the church tradition, [170] and that the surprising turn of Barth's positive discussion on the subjective aspect of the personal sanctification in IV/2 might be regarded as the noteworthy endpoint of his early “crisis-theology.” [171]

However, he pointed out that Barth's too objectivistic and triumphal indicative of Jesus still weakens the concrete imperative of the sanctified man, so that in spite of his self-corrective he continues to be quietistic in the matters which demand “concrete Christian obedience,” with the “full-confident carelessness” of the “grace-triumph” motif.  He also states that the critical weakness of his doctrine of sanctification is that the actual applications to the whole area of life for the total rule of Christ as well as the spontaneous power to realize it does not follow. [172]   Lombard also critically discussed some interesting issues like universalism and the relationship between law and Gospel, as well as its effect on the church-state relationship.  As a whole, he is critical and negative.

In fact, his viewpoint reflects exactly that of his promotor G. C. Berkouwer, one of the most penetrating and powerful critics of Karl Barth, as he represents the reactions of Dutch Neo-Calvinism to Barth's doctrine of sanctification.  The encounter between Karl Barth and Neo-Calvinism unfortunately began with conflicting backgrounds, as far as the doctrine of sanctification is concerned.  The young Barth had a strong distrust of the “Christian” political or cultural actions because of his early experiences with German Liberalism and Christian Socialism.  In the political activities which were promoted in the name of Christianity he found only a collective egotism and cultural religion, while the Neo-Calvinists led by Abraham Kuyper were ambitiously proceeding with the cultural mission of realizing the Lordship of Christ in all areas of life by establishing a “Christian” party, university, newspaper, etc.  Barth's first knowledge of Neo-Calvinism was made probably through Wilhelm Kolfhaus, a passionate follower of Abraham Kuyper in Germany. [173]   In the General Assembly of the German Reformed Church at Emden (1923), however, Barth met the “Kuyperianer” for the first time and came to the negative judgment: “The Gulden-Reformierte recommends the Kuyperianische Calvin-Renaissance in a totally impossible way.” [174]   In 1926 Barth made his first visit to the Netherlands and was welcomed by Theodor L. Haitjema, the first “Barthian” in the country, who was convinced that “Barth offered a healthy correction to Kuyper's Neo-Calvinism.” [175]   Barth gave a lecture, “Church and Culture” in Amsterdam, where he insisted that “There is no visible sanctification; no sanctification which can be seen, proved or measured,” and criticized “cultural Protestantism” for holding that “men with the help of God will finally build that tower (of Babel).” [176]   It was followed by his second visit in 1927 when he continued his criticism in two lectures, “Justification and Sanctification” and “The Keeping of the Commandments” at Utrecht and Leiden. [177]   Barth further criticized Neo-Calvinism in his pneumatology (1929):

Where does one gain the right, speaking supposedly in “Christian” fashion, to reckon “Revolution” as the incarnation of evil, and to take his own anti-revolutionary purpose as conformable to the will of God, without check?  I cannot regard it as good thing to have followed in the wake of A. Kuyper, who scarcely estimated aright the peculiar evil of the nineteenth century, and yet openly followed in the tracks of Christ to fall out of one unrenounced simple opinion into the other. [178]

What, then, is meant by such phrases as “Christian” view of the universe, “Christian” morality, “Christian” art?  What are “Christian” personalities, “Christian” families, “Christian” groups, “Christian” newspapers, “Christian” societies, endeavours, and institutions?  Who gives us permission to use this adjective so profusely? [179]

In addition, he expressed his opposition to Neo-Calvinism in his third visit (1935): “Christian parties?  Christian newspapers?  Christian philosophy?  Christian Universities?  The question must be very seriously asked whether such undertakings are in this sense necessary and legitimate.” [180]

It was enough to provoke Neo-Calvinists, who reacted strongly to Karl Barth and Dutch Barthians.  The history of the controversies between them is well traced by Martien E. Brinkman. [181]   The Neo-Calvinist criticism came first from V. Hepp, who pointed out Barth's “lack of a way”: “Barth looks only at the top of the mountain and not the depth of the valley. He sees nothing of the path leading upward” and sounded “a sort of cantus firmus in all the following Neo-Calvinist criticism on the theology of Karl Barth.” [182]   They “turned away from Barth because they found in him too little concern for the world, or for man in the world.” [183]   Barth's doctrine of sanctification was too abstract and negative for them, so it was seen as “quietism” or “antinomianism.”  The conflict between Dutch Barthians and Neo-Calvinists reached a climax in the 1930's, when both camps counterposed in a “state of war,” as Haitjema wrote a provocative article, “Der Kampf des holländischen Neu-Calvinismus gegen die dialektische Theologie,” in Barth's Festschrift (1936). [184]   It followed excessive Neo-Calvinist criticism of “the destructive and anarchic influence of the `Barthianism' which will make Christian politics impossible and kill all Christian activities.” [185]   Therefore, Barth's active engagement in the political struggle against the Nazi regime puzzled the Neo-Calvinists greatly: “How is it possible that Barth interferes in the church struggle with such great positivity?” [186]   It was G. C. Berkouwer who began to perceive a new development in Barth, i.e., “the all-commanding principle of Barth's theology, the ideas of the freedom and sovereignty of God as `the glowing kernel of Barth's theology'” [187] and gradually appreciated Barth's genuine motif of grace and his historical context.

After the Second World War, Berkouwer and Barth wrote on the doctrine of sanctification in 1949 and 1955 respectively.  And it is remarkable that they referred favourably to each other. [188]   Further, Berkouwer's positive criticism of Barth, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth (1954), made Barth apologize for his previous “fierce attack” on “Dutch Neo-Calvinists in globo.” [189]   So the unfortunate history of misunderstanding and distrust was formally ended. [190]   But this did not mean that Berkouwer and Neo-Calvinists withdrew their basic criticism of Barth's doctrine of sanctification.  He still maintained that Kohlbrugge's early influence on Barth “played a decisive role in his thinking” and there was no “essential modification” in his doctrine of sanctification. [191]   It meant that a quietistic and antinomianistic tendency was still at work, making it powerless in its historical and subjective applications. [192]   As a result, it must be difficult for Lombard to read Barth's new doctrine of sanctification without any prejudice.  It may be true that he was too preoccupied with the “genadetriomf” view of Karl Barth to give proper recognition to Barth's mature and final doctrine of sanctification as newly presented in 1955.  In fact, it had significantly changed from that of the 1920's, which was radically objectivistic and reactionary, as Barth dealt emphatically with “subjective” sanctification and how to follow Jesus here and now for the sanctification of the world in §66.

1.4.3 O. G. Otterness (1969)

One of the contemporary problems within Christian churches is the separation of faith and ethics, that “those who are concerned with social justice are not concerned about personal piety and those who are still concerned about personal piety are hostile to the church's involvement in the quest of social justice.” [193]   As an attempt to heal this divorce, Otterness wrote his Chicago dissertation entitled The Doctrine of Sanctification in the Theology of Karl Barth in 1969.  “This study has proceeded in the belief that there are resources within Barth's theology for a viable social ethic.” [194]   Against the popular notion that “regards the theology of Barth as passé and without a relevant message for secular society,” he was convinced that “the theology of Karl Barth still has a relevant message for our day,” [195] because “Barth, however, seeks to heal this divorce and interprets sanctification as the point where Christian faith and ethics bound together.” [196]   In contrast to Lombard's criticism on Barth's quietism, he contends that “Barth's interpretation delivers the doctrine of sanctification from the pitfalls of legalism and quietism.” [197]

In chapter 1 he attempted to sketch the doctrine of sanctification of five major theologians, i.e., Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, Wesley and Ritschl, who represent the various patterns of the doctrine of sanctification in the history of Christian thought, with an understanding that “Barth has approached the doctrine of sanctification with a depth of historical knowledge and an awareness of the problems involved.” [198]   Then he tried “to place Barth's doctrine of sanctification in the context of his total theological position,” “because there is an interdependence among the parts of Barth's theology which makes it impossible to understand any one doctrine apart from a reference to the whole.” [199]   So he provided “a sketch of the major themes of Barth's theology--election, covenant and creation, reconciliation as justification--which are the essential presuppositions of Barth's doctrine of sanctification,” [200] based upon CD II/2 to IV/1.  Chapters 3 and 4 are his exposition of IV/2.  In chapter 3 he first analyzed the Christological and hamartiological presuppositions to the doctrine of sanctification in §64 and 65.  And then, he described Barth's doctrine of sanctification proper, presented in §66, with a concluding remark that “Thus Barth affirms that there is a `real change' in sanctification.” [201]

Stating that “Barth's greatest contribution to the reconstruction of the doctrine of sanctification has been the personalistic and relational categories to reflect the dynamics of reconciliation within covenant history,” [202] he summarized in chapter 5 Barth's contributions to the reconstruction of the doctrine of sanctification.  These contributions included providing new insight into the nature of man, grace, the church, sanctification as the freedom of discipleship, and the relation of sanctification to Christian ethics.  Rather than purification, deification, or mystical experience, “Barth understands sanctification as the history in which a personal God and a responsible covenant people work for the purpose of fulfilling God's will for a community of justice and mercy.” [203]   Therefore, “the import of Barth's theology for our day is that it provides a basis for a Christian humanism” [204] --“a christological basis for the affirmation of the dignity of man.” [205]

However, he pointed out “two critical problems” which could be “a serious threat to Barth's total position,” [206] because “the centrality of sanctification in the total structure of Barth's dogmatics can't be over-emphasized” [207] and “the whole of Barth's theological structure is at stake at the point of the implications of his doctrine of sanctification for a viable ethic.” [208]   “The first problem has been the difficulty in maintaining that the believer participates in a de facto sanctification,” “because Barth affirms a de facto sanctification in man and then paradoxically feels constrained to deny it.” [209]   The second problem is that “Barth never seriously confronts the question of how sanctification takes place in the historical existence of the believer.” [210]

With a principle of judgment that “the depreciation of the new life of man denies the efficacy of God's redemptive power,” [211] Otterness criticized Barth as follows: “Barth's doctrine of sanctification always runs the danger of an abstract idealization of man as de jure participation in the reality of Christ so that the de facto sanctification of man in history is ignored.  When Barth finally brings his description of sanctification to a close, it turns out to be not our own, but the obedience of the true man, Jesus Christ.  The consequence is that the role of man as God's covenant-partner in any significant way is lost and the very intention of Barth's covenant-centred doctrine of sanctification is called into question.  The structure within which Barth places his positive and constructive description of sanctification serves to deny the reality of its content.” [212]   It has been caused, he analyzed, by following “the Augustinian paradox of grace and freedom,” [213] which violates the integrity of man for the exclusive sovereignty of God's grace.

Finally, in chapter 6, Otterness attempted to identify the crucial problem of Barth's doctrine of sanctification, in order to find a remedy: “The thesis to be argued here is that the place where the difficulty in Barth's dogmatic structure is not at the point of the doctrine of sanctification.  Sanctification, because it necessarily concerns man's subjective involvement, is merely the point where the difficulty becomes most apparent.  The problem itself is rooted in the Christology.  Barth is unable to fulfil the intention of his theology of the covenant because of his total dependence on Christological categories to the exclusion of an adequate doctrine of the Holy Spirit.” [214]   In his criticism on Barth's Christology, Otterness contends that the sanctification of Christ and the sanctification of the sinner are different, for “the human nature of Jesus, however, is less than fully human because the acting subject of Jesus as the God-man is always the divine nature.” [215] ; and that it was influenced by philosophical dualism, especially that of Hegel [historical events and the ideal realm of Geist] and Kant [phenomena and noumena].  But according to Otterness, “if sanctification does not take place at the level of man's historical existence, then it does not exist.” [216]   Even though Barth had realized the inability of his earlier dialectical paradigm to relate God and man and developed the concept of “the humanity of God” to provide both an epistemological and ontological basis for the covenant relationship, this “theoretical solution” was merely a formal solution and a shift in its location to an inner-divine dialectic, [217] as “Barth derives anthropology from his Christology” and “moves from an identity of man with Jesus Christ as representative man to a separation of man (the `phenomenal man') from Jesus Christ with no way of bridging the gap.” [218]   His criticism was thus that “Barth has so christologized the human subject and sanctification that his own insight into the biblical concept of a covenant history involving two personal subjects is lost.” [219]   He also criticized Barth's Pneumatology, because “the second cause of Barth's difficulty in describing the how of sanctification is the lack of an adequate doctrine of the Holy Spirit.” [220]   He contends that Barth's description of the Holy Spirit as the “revealedness of God,” the “relatedness” of the Father to the Son, and the power of Christ recognizes “a functional necessity” for the Holy Spirit but assigns “no distinct ontological status.”

However, his dissertation does not end with criticism.  Otterness attempted to develop Barth's doctrine of sanctification fully, with the conviction that “its [Barth's relational insight] fuller development could resolve the problems encountered in Barth's doctrine of sanctification.” [221]   Because “the analysis of the anomaly of Barth's paradoxical affirmation and denial of sanctification as an empirical reality in the believer's life has revealed that he attempts to accomplish through Christology what properly belongs to a doctrine of the Holy Spirit,” [222] he tried to revise his Pneumatology by emphasizing the Holy Spirit as the Creator of the covenant community and sanctification as His transformation of relationships among them.  And, he concluded that in a pragmatic age to seek for the fruits of the faith, “the answer must come from what we have called sanctification, the realization of justice and love in community, becoming empirically available.” [223]

To be sure, his revisionist approach has some merit for a fair and constructive study, in contrast to the former approaches which are either positive or negative only.  However, his constructive proposal is too short and sketchy to be persuasive.  Further, it still lacks the comprehensive understanding of Barth's doctrine of sanctification, as he also neglects §67 and §68, which present the Holy Spirit's concrete applications of sanctification to the church community and the individual Christian.

1.4.4 M. den Dulk (1987)

In 1987, Den Dulk made another attempt to illuminate Barth's doctrine of sanctification in his dissertation entitled ...Als Twee Die Spreken: Een manier om de heiligingsleer van Karl Barth te lezen. [224]   Unfortunately, it seems that he was not acquainted with the works of Otterness and Tribble.  The only previous work on the subject that he knew was Lombard's dissertation.  It is interesting that Den Dulk started where Lombard had ended.  As stated above, Lombard concluded that there was a discontinuity in Barth's earlier and later thoughts but, in spite of his “self-corrective” in §64.1, his doctrine of sanctification still continues to be quietistic and powerless with a “full-confident carelessness” due to his overemphasis on “genadeobjektivisme.”  Generally, Den Dulk agrees with Lombard's negative conclusion and starts with the presumption that there is a “tension” in Barth's doctrine of sanctification.

In his introductory comments on the background of his study, Den Dulk stated that he was influenced by K. H. Miskotte, who had taught sanctification as “sabotage” and liberation.  Under the influence, he began to read Barth's doctrine of sanctification in §66, and therefore he was naturally attracted by Barth's discussion of sanctification as a break with worldly powers and freedom in §66.3 and 5.  Because he strongly doubted the traditional doctrine of sanctification for its applicability to the contemporary world, “here the veil fell off for me for the first time from the indirect and packed language, and so I found here the entrance to the doctrine of sanctification.” [225]   Soon, however, he became disappointed with Barth, when he found that the other four sections of §66 were so traditional--individualistic and psychological.  So, he began to ask why Barth's doctrine of sanctification embraces the incompatible “double-design” with a “broken structure.”

Therefore, Den Dulk's approach is totally different from Lombard or others.  For his objective is to find out the reason why there is such a tension and assist the readers by offering an analytic perspective to rightly read Barth's doctrine of sanctification.  According to his analysis, §66 is a documentation of dialogues: Barth and Calvin (sections 1, 2, 4 and 6), Barth and Bonhoeffer (section 3), and Barth and Barth (section 5).  So the first six chapters of his dissertation take up the analysis and comparison of the six sections of §66 respectively.  Thus, this new study produced an in-depth analysis of §66 as well as an excellent synopsis of Barth, Calvin and Bonhoeffer in the doctrine of sanctification.

But source criticism is a complicated work which is always insistent but also always uncertain.  And it is extremely risky, especially when the object of analysis is clearly a contemporary work of one author rather than an ancient document of ambiguous authorship.  Therefore Den Dulk's very methodology for the analysis of the mature Barth's final presentation of the doctrine of sanctification in §66 raises an inevitable question.  One aspect of the question concerns its appropriateness, for any theologian is influenced by several thinkers in the formation of his own theology but a mature theologian like Barth is supposed to integrate fully those influences into his own system.  Moreover, while Barth himself had openly expressed his indebtedness in his doctrine of sanctification (§66) not only to Calvin and Bonhoeffer but also others like Luther, Kohlbrügge, Quervain, Gaugler and Berkouwer, why has he limited Barth's theological dialogue partners to only Calvin and Bonhoeffer, even though those two are certainly the major influences on it? 

The other aspect of the question is about the correctness of analysis.  Section 1 [the relationship between sanctification and justification] is indebted clearly to Calvin, though he specifically mentioned that “I am particulary happy to record my general agreement” with Alfred Göhler and G. C. Berkouwer. [226]   Concerning section 4 [conversion], it is also agreeable to Den Dulk for its definite dependence upon Calvin.  Both sections quote extensively from Calvin's Institutes.  On the other hand, section 3 [discipleship] lacks any quotation from Calvin while the quotations from Bonhoeffer's Nachfolge dominate, with an extraordinary eulogy: “Easily the best that has been written on this subject is to be found in The Cost of Discipleship, by Dietrich Bonhoeffer... In these the matter is handled with such depth and precision that I am almost tempted simply reproduce them in an extended quotation.  For I cannot hope to say anything better on the subject than what is said here by a man who, having written on discipleship, was ready to achieve it in his own life, and did in his own way achieve it even to the point of death.  In following my own course, I am happy that on this occasion I can lean as heavily as I do upon another.” [227]   And section 5 [good work] lacks any apparent influence and therefore we can agree with Den Dulk, who has classified this section as his own “without partner.” [228]

However, we find it quite difficult to agree with his attribution of sections 2 and 6 to Calvin.  No doubt, section 6 clearly reflects Bonhoeffer's view of cross-bearing.  In the beginning of the section, Barth clearly states three sources: Calvin, A. de Quervain, and Bonhoeffer. [229]   Moreover, it has to be taken into consideration that this section is an extension of section 3, where the major influence is Bonhoeffer.  At the end of section 3, Barth listed six concrete directions of discipleship and the sixth is cross-bearing.  He has “reserve(d) this aspect for independent treatment in the final sub-section,” because “this final order crowns” the whole call of sanctification. [230]   Barth probably could have integrated Calvin and Bonhoeffer, not to mention the Quervain, rather than concentrating exclusively on Calvin.

But what puzzles most is his attribution of section 2 to Calvin, for Barth's purpose to refer Calvin in this section is only to criticize him.  Barth insisted that Calvin has “weakness which we can never too greatly deplore,” [231] as far as the theme of section 2 is concerned, while he reminded Calvin's “clear insight into the relation between justification and sanctification which we had caused to admire in our first sub-section.” [232]   In the whole structure of §66, section 2 is the “key” section, because it presents Barth's distinctive and total framework of the doctrine of sanctification, while section 1 simply secures the place of §66 in the whole structure of the doctrine of reconciliation and sections 3-6 explain in detail the four forms of sanctification: “discipleship, conversion, good works and the cross,” [233] which was introduced in section 2.  This section must be his own (if not, where is Barth?), though there are some concepts which he borrowed from Calvin, for this section is the most integrated, creative and distinctive part in his doctrine of sanctification.

As a whole, Den Dulk contends that Barth's doctrine of sanctification suffers the inner tension which disables the power of sanctification, because the nature of §66 is a dialogue rather than a fully integrated thought.  It is true that Barth has been always watchful against “God-forgetting psychologizing” (gottvergessene Psychologisieren) and pietistic priority of personal experience.  It is also true that he had been utilizing any helpful sources of the Reformed heritage rather than isolating himself as an independent thinker.  But it cannot be true that he has not integrated those materials in his own theological system and his final doctrine of sanctification is full of self-destructive inner tensions.  In fact, he was presenting a teleological superstructure of the doctrine of sanctification, which embraces the sanctifications of God, Christ, man, church and the world.  In the history of Christianity, no theologian has ever presented such a comprehensive superstructure.  Of course, nobody will deny that Barth's theology as a whole has some inconsistencies or inner dialectical tensions, but here, if there is any, it is a healthy one rather than a disabling block to the whole doctrine.  After all, it is the mature Karl Barth.

Den Dulk clearly demonstrated in chapter 7 that the key concepts like “disturbance” or “limit” were already developed in the early 1920's.  In the “pendant” chapter 8 he made insightful “historical-critical observations” on the historical development of Barth's doctrine of sanctification from the 1920's.  His investigation of Barth's conceptual development in the idea of the covenant is especially valuable, because the formal purpose of sanctification in Barth is to create “the faithful covenant-partner of God.”  In the concluding chapter he presented three criticisms: 1. “Barth's fear of `the God-forgetting psychologizing' has been a bad advisor for his theological work.” [234] ; 2. “Barth's tendency to restrain pneumatology has an un-free and obsessive character.” [235] ; 3. “The argument, that the dialogue that men carry with themselves is `sin' in the sense of `sloth', requires careful distinction.” [236]   And, he concluded with the restatement of his main thesis: “I have tried to bring to light the inner contradiction in Barth's doctrine of sanctification.  In brief, Barth has blocked the entrance to the centre of his doctrine of sanctification by the censorship which he himself imposed.  The power of “debate with oneself” (Auseinandersetzung mit sich selbst) cannot work, because he did not trust on human experience, which is necessary in order to be able to function.” [237]   To him, Karl Barth is “gatekeeper” (poortwachter), who is so watchful and anxious to block the gate completely.  And it is “deliberative.”  So Den Dulk advised Barth's readers to listen to him with “stereophonic hearing,” for Barth's doctrine of sanctification is full of incompatible contradictory statements.

1.4.5 Concluding Synopsis

1. It is amazing that four dissertations in three countries (England, America and the Netherlands) have been produced on the same subject--Barth's doctrine of sanctification--spanning a period of fifty years (1937, 57, 69 and 87).  But, only in one case was reference made to one of the others: only Den Dulk referred only Lombard, who wrote in the same country.

2. All four researchers made their own distinctive approaches to understanding Barth's doctrine of sanctification: the affirmative approach (Tribble), the negative approach  (Lombard), the revisionist approach (Otterness), and the comparative approach (Den Dulk).

3. While the Anglo-American writers (Tribble and Otterness) were positive to Barth's doctrine of sanctification, the Dutch writers (Lombard and Den Dulk) made a critical assessment of it.  The former two were convinced that Barth's doctrine of sanctification could certainly contribute to the sanctification of the Christian church and the world, whereas the latter two registered strong doubts about its contemporary relevance because of their judgment that it lacks the power and spontaneity of Christian sanctification.

4. All three writers who wrote after the publication of CD IV/2 pointed out a kind of inconsistency in Barth's doctrine of sanctification, as an insufficient correction (Lombard), paradoxical constraint (Otterness), or incompatible inner dialectical tension (Den Dulk).  Here it is noteworthy that Barth himself said the opposite in his Preface to IV/2: “Perspicuous readers will surely notice that there is no break with the basic view which I have adopted since my parting from Liberalism, but only a more consistent turn in its development.” [238]

5. Except for Tribble who presented a balanced description, that is, the objective aspect from the Christological perspective and the subjective aspect from the Pneumatological perspective, the other three writers expressed their dissatisfaction with the insufficiency of Barth's considerations of the subjective aspect of sanctification.  Lombard criticized it as too objectivistic to have its practical applications, while Otterness and Den Dulk claimed the practical weakness of Barth's Pneumatology.

6. All previous efforts to understand Barth's doctrine of sanctification have not recognized his distinctive superstructure for the sanctification of the world as the main frame of his doctrine.  Therefore they have been remained only within the area of the personal and individual sanctification and finished their presentation without getting into the greater area of communal sanctification, which is indispensable and essential according to Karl Barth.  Also, though all of them tried to understand it within the total structure of Barth's theology, they (except Tribble, of course) did not made an enough effort to understand it in the total structure of his reconciliation doctrine.  Generally speaking, they tended to review faithfully the previous Church Dogmatics volumes up to IV/1 and up to §66 in IV/2, but almost ignored §67 and 68 even in IV/2, which deals with the Holy Spirit's application of sanctification to the church community and the individual Christian.  Moreover, the lack of study in the doctrine of vocation in IV/3, which clearly illuminates the telos of reconciliation, naturally results in the absence of teleology.  So they understood it as theoretical and objectivistic and failed to appreciate its concrete, subjective, and teleological aspects, which were characteristic of Barth's new and final doctrine of sanctification in §66.

7. In understanding the historical development of Barth's doctrine of sanctification, all four authors have practically ignored the pietistic and socialistic formations before 1916 and the German political struggle during 1933-45, which are quite decisive.  Thus, their discussions have tended to be theoretical and philosophical rather than practical and contextual.  Barth's writings in his anti-Nazi struggle especially had to be seriously considered, if they recognized any difference or discontinuity in his doctrine of sanctification before and after the German political struggle.

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